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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
   Gloria Santiago appeals from an order of the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
dismissing her claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against 
Warminster Township (“Warminster” or the “Township”) and 
three of its senior police officers, including the police chief.  
Santiago claims that she suffered a heart attack after being 
subjected to excessive force during a raid on her home.  Her 
claims against the officers who conducted the raid were 
earlier dismissed as untimely, and she has not appealed that 
order.  We thus consider only her claims against the three 
senior officers, who she alleges planned or acquiesced in the 
use of excessive force, and against the Township, which she 
alleges is liable for the police chief’s plan because he is a 
final policymaker for the Township.   
 
 We conclude that, under the pleading standard set forth 
by the Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
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U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.. 1937 
(2009), Santiago has failed to plead sufficient factual matter 
to give rise to a plausible claim for relief against the senior 
police officers.  Her claim against Warminster also must fail 
because Santiago has failed to plausibly plead that the police 
chief’s conduct caused her any injury.  Accordingly, we will 
affirm. 
 
I. Background1
On the morning of May 13, 2006, Warminster 
conducted a “surround and call out” operation at the home of 
Santiago, a sixty-year-old resident of Warminster.  The 
purpose of the operation was to apprehend Steve Miranda, 
one of Santiago’s grandsons.
 
 
 A. Warminster Conducts the “Surround and Call  
  Out” Operation 
 
2
                                                 
1 The background information in this section is taken 
from Santiago’s Third Amended Complaint and is set forth as 
if true. 
2 The arrest warrant for Steve Miranda also named two 
other individuals, though the record does not state whether 
they were expected to be found at Santiago’s home.  
   The operation was carried out 
by the members of “Alpha Team,” a unit of the Central Bucks 
Special Response Team (“CBSRT”).  The CBSRT is a multi-
jurisdictional police agency consisting of officers 
representing eighteen municipalities, including Warminster.  
The members of Alpha Team were Detective Wayne Jones 
and Officers Jon Ogborn, Frederick Kutzer, and Tim Murphy.  
While only Officer Kutzer was employed directly by 
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Warminster, all outside personnel and equipment were placed 
under the temporary control of Warminster for purposes of 
the May 13th operation.   
 
At the commencement of the operation, the occupants 
of Santiago’s home were awakened by police using a public 
address system.  Santiago and her daughter, Gloria Cotte, 
looked through a window to see an armored vehicle and 
officers wearing combat uniforms and carrying automatic 
weapons.  Upon seeing Cotte looking through the window, 
one of the officers asked her who else was in the house, to 
which she responded “just my family ... this is the Santiago 
family.”  (Third Am. Compl. at ¶ 35.)  The officer then 
ordered everyone to exit the house one at a time.   
 
 Santiago was the first to come out and was 
commanded, at gun point, to raise her hands and walk toward 
the officers.  When she did not raise her hands as high as an 
officer wanted, she was ordered to raise them higher or else 
be shot.  When Santiago reached the officers, Officer Ogborn 
conducted a pat down search, which revealed no weapons but, 
humiliating though it was for Santiago, included touching her 
breasts and crotch.  He then restrained her hands behind her 
back with a plastic zip-tie and seated her on the ground next 
to the police vehicle.  Santiago was frightened and 
complained of chest pain.   
 
 After Santiago left the house, she was followed by 
Steve Miranda and Jonathan Miranda (her two grandsons), 
Herminia Miranda (her granddaughter), and Cotte (her 
daughter).  Her two grandsons were patted down, handcuffed, 
and seated on the ground near Santiago.  Her daughter and 
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granddaughter were patted down but not handcuffed or 
seated.   
 
 Even after the police had arrested Steve Miranda – the 
only occupant for whom they had a warrant – Santiago 
remained seated and restrained.  The officers instructed her 
and Cotte to sign a consent form allowing a search of the 
home.  Santiago, who speaks no English and cannot read or 
write, did not sign and, of course, could not have unless they 
unbound her hands.  Cotte, who later said she “felt coerced,” 
did sign.   
 
 Santiago sat with her hands tied for approximately 
thirty minutes as her home was searched.  Throughout that 
time, she was unable to interfere, was not a flight risk, and 
presented no danger.  She continued to complain of pain and 
eventually told Jonathan Miranda that she felt pain in her 
heart.  Jonathan Miranda told the officers that his 
grandmother was having a heart attack, and an ambulance 
was summoned to take her to the hospital.   
 
 B. Santiago’s Complaints are Filed and Dismissed 
 
  On May12, 2008 – one day before the expiration of 
the statute of limitations – Santiago filed her initial complaint 
in the District Court, citing constitutional violations and state 
law tort claims and naming Warminster, Warminster’s police 
department, John Doe police officers, and CBSRT as 
defendants.  For reasons not pertinent here, the bulk of that 
complaint was dismissed, including all counts against the 
Warminster police department (because it was not a separate 
legal entity from Warminster) and CBSRT (for insufficient 
service of process), and, after a series of amended complaints 
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and further dismissals, the operative pleading left in the case 
is Santiago’s Third Amended Complaint.  That complaint is 
framed in two counts:  (1) a §§ 1983 and 1988 claim against 
Warminster and the individual defendants for violation of the 
Fourth Amendment; and (2) state law claims against the 
individual defendants for assault, battery, false arrest, false 
imprisonment, and harm resulting from a state created danger.  
Unlike earlier versions of the complaint, the Third Amended 
Complaint replaced “John Does” with the names of the 
officers on the scene, identifying Detective Jones and Officers 
Ogborn, Kutzer, and Murphy.  The Third Amended 
Complaint also added, for the first time, allegations against 
three Warminster police officers claimed to have been 
involved in planning and supervising the operation: Chief of 
Police Michael Murphy, Lieutenant Christopher Springfield, 
and Lieutenant James Donnelly, III (collectively, the 
“Supervising Officers”).   
 
The entirety of the allegations against the Supervising 
Officers were contained in three paragraphs: 
 
Chief Michael Murphy is Police Chief of 
Warminster Township Police Department.  
Chief Murphy is a founding member and 
director of the CBSRT.  Although Chief 
Murphy was not present at the scene on May 
13, 2006, he ordered and approved the plan to 
execute the arrest warrants.  This early morning 
“surround and call out” operation specifically 
sought to have all occupants exit the Plaintiff’s 
home, one at a time, with hands raised under 
threat of fire, patted down for weapons, and 
then handcuffed until the home had been 
8 
 
cleared and searched.  Chief Murphy violated 
Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights in that this 
plan used excessive force in restraining 
Plaintiff, a non-target occupant who presented 
no threat or risk, for a lengthy period of time 
and used coercion in obtaining her consent to 
search the premises.     
 
Christopher Springfield was a police officer 
with Warminster Township Police Department.  
On May 13, 2006, he held the rank of 
Lieutenant and was in [sic] placed in charge of 
the “surround and call out” operation by Chief 
Murphy.  Lt. Springfield was responsible for all 
assets including the CBSRT and Warminster 
Township Police Officers.  Lt. Springfield 
violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights in 
that he permitted the use of excessive force in 
restraining Plaintiff, a non-target occupant who 
presented no threat or risk, for a lengthy period 
of time and used coercion in obtaining her 
consent to search the premises. 
 
 Lt. James Donnelly is an officer with the 
Warminster Township Police Department.  On 
May 13, 2006, he was also the Tactical Team 
Leader of CBSRT.  Chief Murphy ordered Lt. 
Donnelly to plan and help execute an early 
morning “surround and call out” operation 
which sought to have all occupants exit the 
Plaintiff’s home, one at a time, with hands 
raised under threat of fire, patted down for 
weapons, and then handcuffed until the home 
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had been cleared and searched.  Lt. Donnelly 
violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights in 
that this plan used excessive force in restraining 
Plaintiff, a non-target occupant who presented 
no threat or risk, for a lengthy period of time, 
and used coercion in obtaining her consent to 
search the premises.  As Tactical Team Leader 
of CBSRT, Lt. Donnelly was responsible for the 
actions of Alpha Team. 
  
 (Third Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 21-23.) 
 
 Both Warminster and the individual defendants moved 
to dismiss and on December 23, 2009, the District Court 
issued an opinion granting the motion.  First, the Court 
dismissed the claims against the officers of Alpha Team as 
barred by the statute of limitations.3
                                                 
3 Because the individual officers were not identified by 
name until after the expiration of the statute of limitations, the 
Court held that the claims against them would survive only if, 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c), the amended 
claims related back to the filing date of the original 
complaint.  That required the individual officers to have had 
notice of the suit within 120 days of the filing of the original 
complaint.  The Court found that there was no evidence that 
the members of Alpha Team had such notice.  The Court 
went on to hold, however, that notice could be imputed to the 
Supervising Officers based on their “identity of interest” with 
Warminster’s police department.  Consequently, it dismissed 
only the claims against the officers of Alpha Team under the 
statute of limitations. 
  Next, the Court 
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dismissed the Fourth Amendment claims against the 
Supervising Officers because it held that Santiago had alleged 
only respondeat superior liability as to them but that 
government officials cannot be liable for constitutional 
violations on that basis.  The Court then dismissed the claim 
against Warminster because Santiago had not alleged that 
Chief Murphy was a “final policymaker,” which is a 
necessary element of the claim Santiago attempted to assert 
against the Township.  Finally, because it had dismissed all of 
Santiago’s federal claims, the Court declined to exercise 
pendent jurisdiction over the state law claims and dismissed 
them, without prejudice.  Santiago’s timely appeal to us 
followed. 
 
II. Discussion4
 On appeal, Santiago argues that the District Court 
erred by dismissing the claims against the Supervising 
Officers and Warminster.  Our review of the District Court’s 
decision to grant the motions to dismiss is plenary.  Fowler v. 
UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 206 (3d Cir. 2009).  We 
take as true all the factual allegations of the Third Amended 
Complaint and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn 
from them, Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 262 
n. 27 (2010), but we disregard legal conclusions and “recitals 
of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 
conclusory statements.”  Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.. at 1949.  “To 
survive a motion to dismiss, ‘a complaint must contain 
 
 
                                                 
4 The District Court had jurisdiction over Santiago’s 
claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343, and we have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to 
relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Sheridan, 609 F.3d at 262 
n.27 (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.. at 1949).  “‘A claim has facial 
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that 
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’”  Id. 
 
 A.  Santiago’s Claims Against the Supervising  
  Officers 
 
 We address first the dismissal of Santiago’s claims 
against the Supervising Officers.  The District Court 
dismissed those claims because it held that Santiago had not 
pled any basis of liability in the Supervising Officers’ own 
acts but, instead, had alleged only a theory of respondeat 
superior liability, which cannot serve as the basis of a claim 
for constitutional violations.  See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.. at 1948 
(“Government officials may not be held liable for the 
unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory 
of respondeat superior.”).  While we conclude that the Third 
Amended Complaint can be read as alleging liability based on 
the Supervising Officers’ own acts, we will nevertheless 
affirm the District Court’s ruling because those allegations 
fail to meet the pleading requirements set forth by the 
Supreme Court in Twombly and Iqbal. 
 
  1. The Nature of Santiago’s Claims 
 
 Liability based on respondeat superior arises “solely 
on the basis of the existence of an employer-employee 
relationship,” regardless of whether the employer had any 
part in causing harm.  Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of New 
York, 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978).  Contrary to the District 
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Court’s view, that is not the theory Santiago advances.  
Instead, Santiago’s allegations appear to invoke a theory of 
liability under which “a supervisor may be personally 
liable … if he or she participated in violating the plaintiff’s 
rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in 
charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in his subordinates’ 
violations.”5
                                                 
5 At oral argument, the Supervising Officers asserted 
that a supervisory liability claim was unavailable to Santiago 
because that claim had been dismissed from an earlier version 
of the complaint.  That assertion is not only inconsistent with 
the briefing, in which the Supervising Officers described 
supervisory liability as Santiago’s “only claim[] against the 
Appellees” (Appellee’s Reply Brief at 24), it also evidences a 
misunderstanding of the record and our precedents.   
  A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile 
While a claim of “failure to train and supervise” was 
asserted in and dismissed from Santiago’s Second Amended 
Complaint, that claim was brought only against Warminster, 
and its dismissal does not foreclose the claims brought against 
the Supervising Officers.  Furthermore, as we have noted 
elsewhere, “[t]here are two theories of supervisory liability,” 
one under which supervisors can be liable if they “established 
and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly 
caused [the] constitutional harm,” and another under which 
they can be liable if they “participated in violating plaintiff’s 
rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person[s] in 
charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in [their] 
subordinates’ violations.”  A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne 
Cnty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(second alteration in original).  The claim against Warminster 
that was dismissed from the Second Amended Complaint 
pertained only to the first theory of supervisory liability, 
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Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004).  Specifically, 
Santiago alleges that Chief Murphy and Lt. Donnelly 
developed a plan that “sought to have all occupants exit the 
Plaintiff’s home, one at a time, with hands raised under threat 
of fire, patted down for weapons, and then handcuffed until 
the home had been cleared and searched.”  (Third Am. 
Compl. at ¶¶ 21, 23.)  The claim is thus that, through the 
creation and authorization of the plan, Chief Murphy and Lt. 
Donnelly “directed others to violate [Santiago’s rights].”  
A.M., 372 F.3d at 586.  The related allegation that Lt. 
Springfield, as the person in charge of the operation, 
“permitted the use of excessive force” appears to be a claim 
that Lt. Springfield “acquiesced in his subordinates’ 
violations.”6
                                                                                                             
while the claim at issue against the Supervising Officers 
pertains primarily to the second.  Accordingly, the dismissal 
of the “failure to train and supervise” claim against 
Warminster is not of significance to our review of the present 
supervisory liability claim against the Supervising Officers. 
6 At oral argument, Santiago stated that, like Lt. 
Springfield, Lt. Donnelly’s liability was also based on 
acquiescence, rather than on having directed the use of force.  
The Third Amended Complaint, however, states that Lt. 
Donnelly is liable because he helped plan the operation and 
“the plan used excessive force,” whereas it states that Lt. 
Springfield was liable because “he permitted the use of 
excessive force.”  Thus, we read the allegations as claiming 
that Lt. Donnelly, like Chief Murphy, directed others to use 
excessive force, whereas Lt. Springfield acquiesced in the use 
of force.  The distinction is not ultimately important, 
however, as the claims fail either way.  
  A.M., 372 F.3d at 586.  Consequently, although 
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the Third Amended Complaint seeks a species of supervisory 
liability, it is not respondeat superior liability. 
 
  2. The Sufficiency of Santiago’s Pleadings 
 
 That Santiago has alleged supervisory liability claims 
does not mean that she has supported those allegations with 
“‘sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim 
to relief that is plausible on its face,’”  Sheridan, 609 F.3d at 
262 n.27 (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.. at 1949), as is required by 
the seminal Supreme Court decisions in Iqbal and Twombly.  
To determine the sufficiency of a complaint under the 
pleading regime established by those cases, a court must take 
three steps:  First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements 
a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.”  Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 
1947. 7
                                                 
7 Iqbal describes the process as only a “two-pronged 
approach.”  129 S. Ct.. at 1950.  It preceded that description, 
however, by noting that it is often necessary to “begin by 
taking note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a 
claim.”  Id. at 1947.  Thus, we view Iqbal as outlining three 
steps. 
  Second, the court should identify allegations that, 
“because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled 
to the assumption of truth.”  Id. at 1950.  Finally, “where 
there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should 
assume their veracity and then determine whether they 
plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.”  Id.   
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   a) The elements of Santiago’s  
    claims 
 
 Our initial task is to “tak[e] note of the elements 
[Santiago] must plead” in order to state a claim of § 1983 
liability.  See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.. at 1947-48 (identifying “[t]he 
factors necessary to establish a Bivens violation” in order to 
determine what “the plaintiff must plead and prove”).   
 
To state a claim of supervisory liability against Chief 
Murphy and Lt. Donnelly, at least of the kind that it appears 
Santiago is advancing, she must plead that they “directed 
others to violate [her rights],” A.M., 372 F.3d at 586.  Of 
course, Chief Murphy and Lt. Donnelly could only be liable if 
the people they supposedly directed to violate her rights 
actually did so; otherwise, “the fact that [Chief Murphy and 
Lt. Donnelly] might have [directed] the use of constitutionally 
excessive force is quite beside the point.”  City of Los Angeles 
v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986).  Thus, any claim that 
supervisors directed others to violate constitutional rights 
necessarily includes as an element an actual violation at the 
hands of subordinates.  In addition, a plaintiff must allege a 
causal connection between the supervisor’s direction and that 
violation, or, in other words, proximate causation. 
 
Proximate causation is established where the 
supervisor gave directions that the supervisor “knew or 
should reasonably have known would cause others to deprive 
the plaintiff of her constitutional rights.”  Conner v. Reinhard, 
847 F.2d 384, 397 (7th Cir. 1988); see also Snell v. Tunnell, 
920 F.2d 673, 700 (10th Cir. 1990).  Particularly after Iqbal, 
the connection between the supervisor’s directions and the 
constitutional deprivation must be sufficient to “demonstrate 
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a ‘plausible nexus’ or ‘affirmative link’ between the 
[directions] and the specific deprivation of constitutional 
rights at issue.”  Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 121 (3d Cir. 
2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
Therefore, to state her claim against Chief Murphy and Lt. 
Donnelly, Santiago needs to have pled facts plausibly 
demonstrating that they directed Alpha Team to conduct the 
operation in a manner that they “knew or should reasonably 
have known would cause [Alpha Team] to deprive [Santiago] 
of her constitutional rights.”  Conner, 847 F.2d at 397. 
 
As to her claim against Lt. Springfield, Santiago must 
allege facts making it plausible that “he had knowledge of 
[Alpha Team’s use of excessive force during the raid]” and 
“acquiesced in [Alpha Team’s] violations.”8
                                                 
8  Numerous courts, including this one, have expressed 
uncertainty as to the viability and scope of supervisory 
liability after Iqbal.  See, e.g., Bayer v. Monroe, 577 F.3d 
186, 190 n.5 (3d Cir. 2009) (“In light of the Supreme Court’s 
recent decision in [Iqbal], it is uncertain whether proof of 
such personal knowledge, with nothing more, would provide 
a sufficient basis for holding [defendant] liable with respect to 
plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claims.”); Dodds v. 
Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1194 (10th Cir. 2010) (noting the 
“important questions about the continuing vitality of 
supervisory liability under § 1983 after the Supreme Court’s 
recent decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal”); Parish v. Ball, 594 F.3d 
993, 1001 (8th Cir. 2010) (“The Supreme Court’s recent 
pronouncement in Iqbal may further restrict the incidents in 
which the ‘failure to supervise’ will result in liability.”).  
Because we hold that Santiago’s pleadings fail even under our 
  A.M., 372 F.3d 
at 586.   
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   b) The allegations that are not  
    entitled to the assumption of truth 
 
 Having identified the elements of Santiago’s claims, 
Iqbal directs that the next step is to identify allegations that, 
“because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled 
to the assumption of truth.”  Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.. at 1950.  In 
other words, “[we] must accept all of the complaint’s well-
pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal 
conclusions.”  Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.  We also disregard 
“naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement” and 
“threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 
supported by mere conclusory statements.”  Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.. 
at 1949.  
 
 Santiago alleges that the plan developed and 
authorized by Chief Murphy and Lt. Donnelly “specifically 
sought to have all occupants exit the Plaintiff’s home, one at a 
time, with hands raised under threat of fire, patted down for 
weapons, and then handcuffed until the home had been 
cleared and searched.”  Because this is nothing more than a 
recitation of what Santiago says the Alpha Team members did 
to her, it amounts to a conclusory assertion that what 
happened at the scene was ordered by the supervisors. While 
the allegations regarding Alpha Team’s conduct are factual 
and more than merely the recitation of the elements of a cause 
of action, the allegation of supervisory liability is, in essence, 
that “Murphy and Donnelly told Alpha team to do what they 
                                                                                                             
existing supervisory liability test, we need not decide whether 
Iqbal requires us to narrow the scope of that test.   
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did” and is thus a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a 
[supervisory liability] claim,” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.. at 1951 
(internal quotation marks omitted) – namely that Chief 
Murphy and Lt. Donnelly directed others in the violation of 
Santiago’s rights.  Saying that Chief Murphy and Lt. 
Donnelly “specifically sought” to have happen what allegedly 
happened does not alter the fundamentally conclusory 
character of the allegation. 9
 Our conclusion in this regard is dictated by the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Iqbal.  The plaintiff’s claim in 
that case required proving that the defendants, Attorney 
General John Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert Mueller, had 
“adopted a policy because of, not merely in spite of, its 
adverse effects upon an identifiable group.”  129 S. Ct.. at 
1951.  The Court disregarded allegations that “petitioners 
knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to 
subject [respondent] to harsh conditions of confinement as a 
matter of policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race, 
and/or national origin” and that “Ashcroft was the principal 
 
 
                                                 
9 We recognize that Santiago’s allegations against 
Chief Murphy and Lt. Donnelly are not precisely of the “they 
said to do it” variety because there are some distinctions 
between what Santiago alleges happened and what Santiago 
alleges was ordered.  In particular, Santiago alleges that the 
Supervising Officers ordered everyone to be handcuffed but 
that certain occupants were not actually handcuffed.  
Nonetheless, the breadth and conclusory nature of Santiago’s 
allegations are such that they appear to us to be, in practical 
effect, indistinguishable from purely “they said to do it” 
allegations.  
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architect of this invidious policy, and that Mueller was 
instrumental in adopting and executing it.”  Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  The Supreme Court called those 
allegations “nothing more than a formulaic recitation of the 
elements of a constitutional discrimination claim.”  Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  The Court emphasized 
that the claims required dismissal not because they were 
fanciful, but because they were conclusory.  Id.  Likewise, in 
this case where Santiago is required to prove that the 
Supervising Officers directed others to use excessive force, an 
allegation that the plan “specifically sought” that use of force 
is nothing more than a formulaic recitation of the elements of 
a supervisory liability claim and hence is not entitled to the 
assumption of truth.  The same is true for Santiago’s 
allegation that Lt. Springfield “permitted the use of excessive 
force,” which is nothing more than a conclusory statement 
that he acquiesced in his subordinates’ violations.   
 
In short, Santiago’s allegations are “naked 
assertion[s]” that Chief Murphy and Lt. Donnelly directed 
Alpha Team to conduct the operation in the allegedly 
excessive manner that they did and that Lt. Springfield 
acquiesced in Alpha Team’s acts.  As mere restatements of 
the elements of her supervisory liability claims, they are not 
entitled to the assumption of truth.  However, it is crucial to 
recognize that our determination that these particular 
allegations do not deserve an assumption of truth does not 
end the analysis.  It may still be that Santiago’s supervisory 
liability claims are plausible in light of the non-conclusory 
factual allegations in the complaint.  We therefore turn to 
those allegations to determine whether the claims are 
plausible. 
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   c) The plausibility of Santiago’s  
    claims 
 
  “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff 
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 
misconduct alleged.”  Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.. at 1949. Other than 
the conclusory allegations just discussed, the remaining 
allegations regarding the Supervising Officers are as follows:  
 
Chief Michael Murphy is Police Chief of 
Warminster Township Police Department.  
Chief Murphy is a founding member and 
director of the CBSRT.  Although Chief 
Murphy was not present at the scene on May 
13, 2006, he ordered and approved the plan to 
execute the arrest warrants. … 
 
Christopher Springfield was a police officer 
with Warminster Township Police Department.  
On May 13, 2006, he held the rank of 
Lieutenant and was in placed in [sic] charge of 
the “surround and call out” operation by Chief 
Murphy.  Lt. Springfield was responsible for all 
assets including the CBSRT and Warminster 
Township Police Officers. … 
 
 Lt. James Donnelly is an officer with the 
Warminster Township Police Department.  On 
May 13, 2006, he was also the Tactical Team 
Leader of CBSRT.  Chief Murphy ordered Lt. 
Donnelly to plan and help execute an early 
morning “surround and call out” operation … .  
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As Tactical Team Leader of CBSRT, Lt. 
Donnelly was responsible for the actions of 
Alpha Team. …  
 
(Third Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 21-23.) 
 
For purposes of analyzing the motions to dismiss, we 
take those factual allegations as true and also accept as 
accurate the factual allegations regarding Alpha Team’s 
execution of the operation.  In summary, the allegations 
against Alpha Team are that the officers ordered everyone to 
exit the house one at a time; that Santiago exited first under 
threat of fire; that Santiago was patted down in a demeaning 
fashion, found to be unarmed, and subsequently handcuffed; 
that the remaining occupants of the home then exited, some of 
whom were handcuffed while others were not; that Santiago’s 
daughter was coerced into consenting to a search of the home; 
and that Santiago was left restrained for thirty minutes while 
her home was searched, during which time she had a heart 
attack.   
 
The question then becomes whether those allegations 
make it plausible that Chief Murphy and Lt. Donnelly 
directed Alpha Team to conduct the operation in a manner 
that they “knew or should reasonably have known would 
cause [Alpha Team] to deprive [Santiago] of her 
constitutional rights,” Conner, 847 F.2d at 397, or that Lt. 
Springfield “had knowledge [that Alpha Team was using 
excessive force during the raid]” and “acquiesced in [Alpha 
Team’s] violations.”  A.M., 372 F.3d at 586. 
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 (1) The plausibility of the 
claims against Chief 
Murphy and Lt. Donnelly 
 
 First, with respect to Chief Murphy and Lt. Donnelly, 
we consider whether the fact that they planned the operation 
coupled with the fact that the operation resulted in excessive 
force against Santiago makes it plausible that the plan called 
for the use of excessive force.  We conclude that it does not.  
Santiago has only alleged that excessive force was used 
against her.  The complaint does not allege that any other 
occupant was threatened with fire.  It specifically states that 
the other women were not handcuffed.  It does allege that the 
two grandsons were handcuffed, but one of them was the 
subject of the arrest warrant and there are no allegations 
stating whether the other was found to be armed or a risk of 
flight.  Consequently, there is no basis in the complaint to 
conclude that excessive force was used on anyone except 
Santiago.  Even if someone else had been subjected to 
excessive force, it is clear that the occupants were not being 
treated uniformly.  Thus, Santiago’s allegations undercut the 
notion of a plan for all occupants to be threatened with fire 
and handcuffed.  While it is possible that there was such a 
plan, and that Alpha Team simply chose not to follow it, 
“possibility” is no longer the touchstone for pleading 
sufficiency after Twombly and Iqbal.  Plausibility is what 
matters.  Allegations that are “merely consistent with a 
defendant’s liability” or show the “mere possibility of 
misconduct” are not enough.  Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.. at 1949-50 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Here, given the disparate 
treatment of the occupants of the home, one plausible 
explanation is that the officers simply used their own 
discretion in determining how to treat each occupant.  In 
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contrast with that “obvious alternative explanation” for the 
allegedly excessive use of force, the inference that the force 
was planned is not plausible.  Id. at 1951-52 (quoting 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567). 
 
Where, as here, an operation results in the use of 
allegedly excessive force against only one of several people, 
that use of force does not, by itself, give rise to a plausible 
claim for supervisory liability against those who planned the 
operation.  To hold otherwise would allow a plaintiff to 
pursue a supervisory liability claim anytime a planned 
operation resulted in excessive force, merely by describing 
the force used and appending the phrase “and the Chief told 
them to do it.”  Iqbal requires more. 
 
    (2) The plausibility of the  
     claim against Lt.   
     Springfield   
 
 We next ask whether the allegation that Lt. Springfield 
was placed in charge of the operation, coupled with what 
happened during the operation, makes it plausible that Lt. 
Springfield knew of and acquiesced in the use of excessive 
force against Santiago.  Again, we conclude that it does not.  
The complaint implies but does not allege that Lt. Springfield 
was present during the operation.  Assuming he was present, 
however, the complaint still does not aver that he knew of the 
allegedly excessive force, nor does it give rise to the 
reasonable inference that he was aware of the level of force 
used against one individual.  See McKenna v. City of 
Philadelphia, 582 F.3d 447, 460 (3rd Cir. 2009) (holding that 
a supervisor’s presence “in the vicinity of the arrest at some 
point after [plaintiff] was handcuffed … is not a legally 
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sufficient evidentiary basis” to find knowledge and 
acquiescence).  Consequently, the allegations are insufficient 
to “nudge [Santiago’s] claims across the line from 
conceivable to plausible.”  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 
 
In sum, while Santiago’s complaint contains sufficient 
allegations to show that the Supervising Officers planned and 
supervised the operation and that, during the operation, Alpha 
Team used arguably excessive force, her allegations do 
nothing more than assert the element of liability that the 
Supervising Officers specifically called for or acquiesced in 
that use of force.  As a result, her allegations may “get[] the 
complaint close to stating a claim, but without further factual 
enhancement [they] stop[] short of the line between 
possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.”  
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (internal quotation marks and 
alterations omitted).  Because the Third Amended Complaint 
does not give rise to a plausible claim for relief against the 
Supervising Officers, the District Court did not err in 
dismissing the claims against them.10
                                                 
10 The Third Amended Complaint was filed after the 
close of discovery.  Consequently, there is no reason to 
believe that Santiago’s conclusory allegations were simply 
the result of the relevant evidence being in the hands of the 
defendants.  Under Iqbal, however, the result would be the 
same even had no discovery been completed.  We recognize 
that plaintiffs may face challenges in drafting claims despite 
an information asymmetry between plaintiffs and defendants.  
Given that reality, reasonable minds may take issue with 
Iqbal and urge a different balance between ensuring, on the 
one hand, access to the courts so that victims are able to 
obtain recompense and, on the other, ensuring that 
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B. Santiago’s Claim Against Warminster 
 
 We now turn to the dismissal of Santiago’s claim 
against Warminster.  The District Court dismissed that claim 
because Santiago had failed to allege that Chief Murphy was 
a final policymaker, which, under Monell, was necessary to 
the survival of her claim against the Township.  Santiago 
offers two arguments for why the dismissal was improper.  
First, she argues that, while she may not have used the words 
“final policymaker,” “the factual averments of the complaint 
are more than sufficient to show that Chief Murphy was the 
‘final policymaker’ with respect to the tactical decisions made 
here.”  (Appellant’s Opening Brief at 23.)  Second, she argues 
that the District Court applied the wrong standard – 
considering whether Chief Murphy was a final policymaker 
as a factual question instead of a legal one, as required under 
Supreme Court precedent.  Not only are those arguments 
inconsistent, they miss the point.  The dispositive point is 
that, whether or not Chief Murphy is a final policymaker, 
Santiago has failed to plead facts showing that his plan 
caused her injury. 
 
                                                                                                             
municipalities and police officers are not unnecessarily 
subjected to the burdens of litigation.  See Arthur R. Miller, 
From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 2 (2010) 
(arguing that Twombly and Iqbal give “too much attention to 
claims … of expense and possible abuse and too little on 
citizen access, a level litigation playing field, and the other 
values of civil litigation”).  The Supreme Court has struck the 
balance, however, and we abide by it. 
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 Under Monell, for municipal liability to attach, any 
injury must be inflicted by “execution of a government’s 
policy or custom.”  436 U.S. at 694.  Drawing all factual 
inferences in favor of Santiago, as is required at this juncture, 
we nevertheless cannot conclude that the Third Amended 
Complaint alleges municipal liability.  The complaint does 
not allege that Chief Murphy had policymaking authority,11
                                                 
11 While Santiago is correct that, whether Chief 
Murphy is a final policymaker is ultimately a legal rather than 
a factual question, City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 
112, 124 (1988), that does not relieve her of the obligation to 
plead in some fashion that he had final policy making 
authority, as that is a key element of a Monell claim.  In any 
event, as a matter of Pennsylvania state law, a township 
Police Chief is not a final policymaker.  See 53 PA. STAT. 
ANN. § 66902 (vesting authority over the “organization and 
supervision” of township police officers with the township 
board of supervisors); Hicks v. Warminster Township, No. 
Civ. A. 00-2895, 2001 WL 1159750, at *3 (E.D.Pa. July 26, 
2001) (“In such townships, all of the policymaking power, 
including over the local police force, is vested in the town 
supervisors.”).  Moreover, the Supreme Court has forbidden 
courts from “assuming that municipal policymaking authority 
lies somewhere other than where the applicable law purports 
to put it.”  Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 125 n.1, 126.  
 
nor does it allege what action he took that could fairly be said 
to be policy.  The allegation that Chief Murphy ordered a plan 
to execute arrest warrants does not imply the existence of an 
official policy in violation of Santiago’s constitutional rights.  
See McTernan v. City of York, 564 F.3d 636, 658 (3d Cir. 
2009) (a claimant “must identify a custom or policy, and 
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specify what exactly that custom or policy was”); see also 
McGreal v. Ostrov, 368 F.3d 657, 685 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he 
plaintiff must first allege that a defendant is a final 
policymaker.  Only then can a court proceed to the next 
question of whether the single act or single decision of that 
defendant constituted municipal policy.”)  More to the point, 
though, we have already held that Santiago’s pleadings fail to 
plausibly allege that Chief Murphy directed others to violate 
her rights.  Thus, even if Chief Murphy were a final policy 
maker and his plan were deemed to be official Warminster 
policy, Santiago has failed to properly plead that the plan was 
the source of her injury.  Therefore, she has not shown that 
her injury was inflicted by “execution of [Warminster’s] 
policy or custom,” Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, and she has no 
claim against the Township. 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s order dismissing Santiago’s claims.  
